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Volume 6 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND Issue I 
LAW REVIEW1983 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 

INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES 

CLAUDE T. COFFMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a court has before it a question of statutory interpreta­
tion, what difference does it make, or should it make, that the provi­
sion has previously been construed by an administrative agency? 
The court, we know, has the final say, but should it give weight to 
the administrative interpretation, even though that interpretation 
may not be the one which the court itself would have placed on the 
statute (a limited scope of review)? Or should an independent judg­
ment be reached by the court as to its meaning? Put in a different 
way, is the court's function to decide how, as an original proposition, 
it would construe the statute, or should the court go no further than 
determining whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable? The 
field is one of great uncertainty in which equally impressive cases 
may be found to cite in favor of deferring to the determination of the 
administrator or giving it no weight whatever. 
Where they have given weight to the agency's determination, 
courts have used a variety of expressions to describe how much 
weight: the agency's determination is to be accepted if it has" 'war­
rant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law"; I the proper scope 
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is one of "rational basis";2 "serious deference" must be given to the 
administrator's determination;3 the agency's interpretation is "enti­
tled to respect";4 the agency's definition should be affirmed "if that 
definition does not appear too farfetched";5 constructions of statutes 
by those charged with the administration of the statute must be sus­
tained "unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the . . . 
statutes."6 Whatever the expression used, the essential meaning is 
that the administrator's interpretation will be upheld if it is 
"reasonable."7 
The federal Administrative Procedure ActS provides that: "To 
the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu­
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and ap­
plicability of the terms of an agency action."9 
While it is clear that the ultimate decision on the interpretation 
of a statute belongs to the judiciary, the legislative prescriptions of 
procedure shed no light upon whether the court, in making its deter­
mination, should give weight to the agency's prior construction of 
the provision. For the answer to that question, one must resort to the 
court decisions. 
II. SOME PROPOSED ANSWERS 
Let us begin with Judge Friendly's observation in a recent case: 
We think it is time to recognize, in line with Professor Ken­
neth Culp Davis' brilliant discussion. . . that there are two lines 
of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically 
in conflict. with the result that a Court of Appeals must choose the 
2. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934). 
3. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484 (1979). 
4. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
5. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956). 
6. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969) (quoting with approval Commis­
sioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948». 
7. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart put it this way in Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968): 
The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with administering it is 
entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be af­
firmed if it has a "reasonable basis in law." ... But the courts are the final 
authorities on issues of statutory construction. . . and "are not obliged to stand 
aside and rubberstamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they 
deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional 
policy underlying a statute." 
8. 5 U.S.c. §§ 551-706 (1982). 
9. Id. § 706. 
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one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. 10 
Not only are there two conflicting lines of decision - one line 
deferring to the determination of the administrator, II the other 
reaching an independent judgment l2 - but the Court has also given 
no consistent rationale as to why it sometimes uses one approach and 
sometimes the other.13 This situation has provided commentators 
with an opportunity for extensive debate on the subject resulting in a 
number of suggested theories from which one may plausibly 
choose. 14 
The conventional approach in determining the scope of review 
has been to attempt to distinguish between findings of fact and con­
clusions of law. 15 Questions of law are to be determined by the 
court, while determinations of facts, if supported by substantial evi­
10. Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (re­
ferring to 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.09 (1958 & Supp. 1970». 
II. Some of the leading cases supporting the view that deference must be given to 
the decisions of an administrative agency are NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 
U.S. III (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. U.S., 307 
U.S. 125 (1939). 
12. Among the cases sanctioning the exercise of independent judgment by the 
court are Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); 
NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 
U.S. 485 (1947). 
13. In some cases, for example, the Court has explained its independent approach 
on the ground that the issue was a question of law. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 
(1970); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
Yet in cases like O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), and 
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904), where the question was recognized to 
be largely one of law, the Court did not take an independent approach. 
In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607 (1944), the Court explained its 
independent approach on the ground that the administrative agency used the wrong 
"factor" in making its decision. 
Occasionally, the question of independent approach vis-a-vis a deferential approach 
has been said to tum on whether the agency interpretation is "consistent with the Con­
gressional purpose." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
Some cases justify taking a deferential approach either on the ground that the issue 
is a question of fact, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), or that it 
belonged to the "usual administrative routine," Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), or 
that the decision calls for administrative expertise, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n., Inc. 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 
269 (1956). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50. 
15. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 30.08 (1958); GELLHORN, 
BYSE & STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 251 (7th ed. 1979); L. 
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546 (1965). The Administrative 
Procedure Act provides that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of 
law." 5 U.S.C § 706 (1982). 
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dence, are appropriately left to the administrative agency.16 But 
Professor Dickinson long ago pointed out the weakness of relying 
upon this distinction. As he says: 
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "ques­
tions of fact" really gives little help in determining how far the 
courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed 
distinction. They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of ques­
tions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of law 
grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach up­
ward, without a break, into matters of law.... It would seem 
that when the courts are unwilling to review, they are tempted to 
explain by the easy device of calling the question one of "fact"; 
and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of 
"law."17 
Professor Dickinson's observations are aptly demonstrated by Roch­
ester Telephone Corp. v. United States .18 There the issue was whether 
one corporation was "controlled" by another. The Court stated: 
"This is an issue of fact to be determined by the special circum­
stances of each case."19 In a similar vein is O'Leary v. Brown-Pac!ftc­
Maxon, Inc. 20 which arose under the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' ACt.21 That act authorizes payment for accidental injury or 
death "arising out of and in the course of employment."22 The ques­
tion was whether a drowning, which occurred during. a rescue at­
tempt in a channel near a recreational center maintained by the 
employer, "arose out of and in the course of [the employee's] em­
ployment."23 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: 
The Deputy Commissioner treated the question whether the 
particular rescue attempt described by the evidence was one of the 
class covered by the Act as a question of "fact." Doing so only 
serves to illustrate once more the variety of ascertainments cov­
ered by the blanket term "fact." Here of course it does not con­
note a simple, external, physical event as to which there is 
conflicting testimony. The conclusion concerns a combination of 
happenings and the inferences drawn from them. In part at least 
16. See supra notes 13 & 15. 
17. J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 55 (1927) (emphasis in original). 
18. 307 U.S. 125 (1939). 
19. Id. at 145 (followed in Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick, 353 U.S. 151, 169 (1957». 
20. 340 U.S. 504 (1951). 
21. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976). 
22. Id § 902(2). 
23. O'Leary, 340 U.S. at 506. 
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the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the 
simple, external facts. Yet the standards are not so severable from 
the experience of industry nor of such a nature as to be peculiarly 
appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment as "questions 
of law."24 
In contrast with the two previous decisions is a case arising 
under the National Labor Relations Act.25 Section 10 of that Act 
empowers the National Labor Relations Board, when it finds that 
an unfair labor practice exists, to "take such affirmative action in­
cluding reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will 
effectuate the policies" of the Act. 26 The term "employee" was de­
fined to include "any individual whose work has ceased as a conse­
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or 
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any 
other regular and substantially equivalent employment. . . ."27 The 
Court reversed the Board's order to reinstate employees who had 
engaged in a "sit-down" strike, saying, by way of explanation: "We 
are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers 
to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful con­
duct, - to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from 
discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's 
property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at 
work."28 Here, the Court treated the issue of whether the term "em­
ployee" applied to such persons as a legal question. 
Similarly, in a more recent case,29 a statute permitted participat­
ing farmers to assign their payments only as security for cash or ad­
vances to finance "making a crop."30 The Secretary of Agriculture 
had issued regulations permitting assignments to secure the payment 
of cash rent for land used in farming. 31 When the regulations were 
challenged in court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the statute, au­
thorizing the Secretary to promulgate such regulations "as he may 
deem proper," did not commit the task of defining "making a crop" 
entirely to the discretionary judgment of the Secretary. "On the con­
trary," according to Douglas, "since the only or principal dispute 
24. Id at 507-08. 
25. 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-69 (1976). 
26. Id. § 160(c). 
27. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1976». 
28. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurigical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939). 
29. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
30. Act of Nov. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187 (1965). 
31. 31 Fed. Reg. 2815 (1966) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 709 (1983». 
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relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must 
ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special 
competence of the Secretary, but by judicial application of canons of 
statutory construction."32 
Is the question one of law, or is it a question of fact, when, for 
example, as in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. ,33 the statute uses 
the term "employee" and the issue is whether newsboys are covered 
by that term.34 When examined from one angle, it appears to be a 
determination of fact as to whether newsboys are employees; from 
the other angle it appears to be a question of law-whether "em­
ployee" covers newsboys. 
The question is an old one. Holmes and Thayer debated the 
issue in describing the function of the jury in negligence cases.35 
Thayer viewed the jury function as simply drawing further infer­
ences from the facts at hand, "namely, the behavior, in a supposed 
case, of the prudent man."36 Holmes, on the other hand, thought 
each case involved the determination of a "standard of conduct" and 
that even though this was left to the jury it was in reality a conclu­
sion of law.37 
The process that goes by the name of "interpretation," Pound 
has suggested, actually encompasses two separate steps: (1) deter­
mining the meaning of the statute as it was framed and with respect 
to its intended scope; and (2) applying to the facts at hand the provi­
sion so interpreted.38 Professor Brown would utilize this line of de­
marcation in partitioning authority between court and agency: 
[T]he interpretation or definition of [a statute] is a matter of "law" 
properly for courts. On the other hand, when the law is capable of 
no further definition, the question whether the facts of the particu­
lar case meet the legal norm is a matter of fact and for the fact­
finding agency. 39 
32. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970). 
33. 322 U.S. III (1944). 
34. Id. at 113. 
35. J.B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 
(1898); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
36. See THAYER, supra note 35, at 228. 
37. See HOLMES, supra note 35, at 126. 
38. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 106-09 (1922). 
39. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 904 (1943). 
See also DICKINSON, supra note 17, at 313-14. The distinction lies "between the task of 
establishing a definition, and that of saying whether or not particular facts correspond 
with it. The former is the question for the court, the latter is for the fact-finding body." 
Professor Schotland expresses a similar notion: The "general construction of a statute 
wholly independently of the particular controversy at bar" is for the courts, while apply­
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To attempt to determine the meaning of the statute independently of 
the facts at hand would be unrealistic. To the extent that a statute 
has meaning independently of the facts, that meaning will generally 
be evident and need no interpretation.40 In most cases, an issue of 
interpretation arises only because there is a question as to whether 
the statutory provision is applicable to the facts presented. 
Nearer to the truth is the description of the decisional process as 
(1) the finding of the existence of facts of a "basic" or underlying 
nature; (2) from these basic facts, finding the ultimate facts according 
to the language of the statute; and (3) from this finding the decision 
will follow by the application of the statutory criterion.41 Consider 
the example of the question in the Hearst case,42 whether newsboys 
were "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Rela­
tions Act. The NLRB found that the newsboys were in charge of 
streetcomer stands. Hearst assigned the street comers, allocated the 
newspapers among the newsboys, and fixed the price at which the 
newsboys were to sell the papers to the public. Hearst also pre­
scribed the hours of work and imposed certain sanctions on the tardy 
and the delinquent.43 All of these findings were certainly findings of 
fact. But there remained the question whether, assuming the facts to 
be true, the newsboys were "employees." It is this final step in the 
decisional process that causes doubt and confusion. "Finding so­
called ultimate 'facts,' " said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "more clearly 
implies the application of standards of law."44 
Professor Byse advances the suggestion that the proper scope for 
the reviewing court is to decide independently whether the agency 
was entitled, in making its decision, (I) to consider a particular fac­
tor; or (2) to give a particular factor controlling weight; or (3) to 
refuse to consider a possibly relevant factor.45 This is necessary, he 
reasons, to determine whether the administrator's action is consistent 
with the particular statute and the congressional purpose. If the fur­
ing a statute so interpreted to the particular facts at bar is mainly for the agency. Schot­
land, Scope ofReview o.fAdministrative Action-Remarks Before the D. C Circuit Judicial 
Conference, March 18, 1974, 34 FED. B.l. 54, 58 (1975). 
40. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see the author's article, Coffman, Essay on 
Statutory Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST. V.L. REV. 57 (1978). 
41. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d. 554, 559 (D.C. Cir.) cerl. denied, 
305 U.S. 613 (1938). 
42. 322 U.S. III (1944). 
43. Id. at 116-19. 
44. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944). 
45. Byse, The Availability and Scope o.fJudicial Review ofAdministrative Action by 
Ordinary Courts, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOG­
ICAL REVOLUTION 543, 559-65 (1. Hazard & w. Wagner, eds., 1974). 
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ther step of applying the factors to the facts presented is necessary 
for the agency to reach a determination, the scope of review as to the 
agency's determination in that instance is limited.46 
To Professor Jaffe, the controlling principle is that when the 
judges are convinced that a certain reading, or application, of the 
statute is the correct-or the only faithful-reading or application, 
they should intervene and so declare.47 Where the result of their 
study leaves them without a definite preference, they can and often 
should abstain from interfering if the agency's preference is 
"reasonable."48 
Still others have suggested that expertise-the comparative 
qualifications of agency and court in resolving the issue-should be 
the guide.49 
Professor Davis concludes that the court's choice between sub­
stituting its judgment for that of the agency's and using the reasona­
bleness test is not guided by any explicit theory but depends upon 
judicial discretion. 50 
N one of these approaches affords a very satisfactory guide on 
which administrators or lower courts may rely in construing statu­
tory language. Hence this search for a better framework of analysis. 
III. A DIFFERENT ANALYSIS 
Before proceeding to a discussion of a different framework for 
analysis, a preliminary observation should be made. It is clear that a 
court will determine independently (1) the meaning of a statute 
which applies to more than one agency;51 (2) whether a given statute 
should be given retroactive effect;52 or (3) which of two inconsistent 
statutes applies to the facts presented.53 The reasons for this are 
clear. In the case of a statute that is applicable to more than one 
46. Id. at 565-67. 
47. L. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 572 (1965). 
48. Id. 
49. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg., 341 U.S. 322, 326-28 (l951)(Frankfurter, J., and 
Douglas, J., dissenting); See also J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 145-49 
( 1938). 
50. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at § 30.08 (1958); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 
THE SEVENTIES § 30.00 (1976). 
51. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1982»; General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000a through h-6 (Supp. V 1981); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1982». 
52. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Lindsay, 
346 U.S. 568 (1954). 
53. Although no case has been found on the point, independent determination of 
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agency, a court must give an interpretation that applies to all. Even if 
there were not conflicting views between agencies, it would be inap­
propriate to have the interpretation depend upon the agency whose 
decision, encompassing the issue, reached a court. In the case of a 
question as to whether a statute should be given retroactive effect, or 
as to which of two inconsistent statutes applies to a given set of facts, 
the issues are of a kind that make them peculiarly appropriate for 
judges to decide. That still leaves, however, the question which is 
most commonly encountered, namely, what are or should be the re­
spective roles for the court and for the agency charged with the ad­
ministration of an act in determining whether a statutory term 
applies to a given set of facts? 
We might ask ourselves the question: Why do we insist upon 
judicial review of administrative actions in the first place? Our de­
sire to have courts review administrative actions arises from the his­
toric principle of the "supremacy of law" or " rule of law" as it is 
called. We want an independent assessment by the court to see that 
the agency has stayed within the bounds authorized by the legisla­
ture. This is the controlling principle to which the court should have 
regard when it reviews agency action. While it may be asserted that 
the "correct" interpretation of every word in a statute is necessary 
for the exercise of power by the administrative agency, the interpre­
tation of certain provisions may be regarded as having special signif­
icance in determining whether the agency is acting outside its 
delegated power. The thesis put forward here is that the question 
ought not to be viewed as simply a matter of determining the mean­
ing of the prescribed text to be arrived at by a given legal technique 
and therefore one which courts are uniquely qualified to decide. In­
stead, the question should be answered in terms of whether the par­
ticular issue is one which has been delegated to the agency for 
decision, or whether it is one which will determine the extent of the 
agency's delegation. If the former, the court should leave the 
agency's determination undisturbed if it is a reasonable construction, 
in order not to stifle effective development of policy. If the latter, the 
court should make an independent evaluation in order to ensure that 
the agency does not stray from its delegated power. 
To ensure that the agency stays within its mandate, agency in­
terpretations should be independently assessed when the limit of its 
discretion under the statute or any subordinate provision is at issue. 
this type of interpretive issue would appear to be equally as clear as it is in the other two 
types of interpretive issues mentioned. 
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Where, however, the statutory term involves an issue within the 
agency's discretion, its interpretation, if reasonable, should not be 
overridden. 
In cases involving questions of statutory construction falling 
within an agency's discretion, the requirement that the "correctness" 
of every interpretation be subject to an independent determination 
by the court would cost more than we would gain. First, it would, to 
some significant degree, cause a diminution of administrative energy 
by taking from its hands responsibility for the decision. Who, from 
within the administrative process, has not heard an administrator 
say, "Well, if he is entitled to a court decision on this, there is no 
point in my taking any more time on it," and then proceed to a de­
termination without the same thorough consideration of the claim­
ant's position that he would otherwise give to it? "Responsibility," 
said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "is the great developer of men."54 
At the same time, however, the interest of the judiciary is to 
avoid the accusation of being a rubber stamp for administrative in­
terpretations. But courts need not go so far as to develop an interpre­
tation of their own; it should suffice to determine that the agency's 
interpretation is reasonable. 
It is sometimes argued that the courts must independently as­
sign a meaning to the statute, for if the agency's interpretation is not 
"correct," the agency is acting illegally. This falsely assumes that 
words have one meaning and no other. We must recognize that the 
interpretation of statutes, as Mr. Justice Holmes has stated, involves 
not just "taking the words and a dictionary" in order to determine 
their meanings. 55 Nor do the types of issues of interpretation con­
fronted in this area often present questions "of an essentially legal 
nature in the sense that legal education and lawyers' learning afford 
peculiar competence for their adjustment."56 Rather, the appropri­
ate construction of a statute may be a matter of policy - a matter 
Congress chose to delegate to an administrative body, not the courts. 
IV. COURT CASES 
The basis on which this notion proceeds first emerged in ICC v. 
United States ex reI Humbolt Steamship Company, 57 an early case 
54. St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,92 (1936). 
55. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
56. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (l939)(Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
57. 224 U.S. 474 (1912). 
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under the Interstate Commerce Act.58 That Act gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission jurisdiction over carriers operating "from 
one State or Territory,. . . to any other State or Territory . . . or 
from one place to another place in the same Territory."59 A steam­
ship company petitioned the Commission alleging that the White 
Pass and Yukon Railway Company, operating in Alaska, violated 
the Act. The Commission, however, construed the word "territory" 
to include only so-called "organized territories" such as New Mexico 
or Arizona were at that time.60 The steamship company instituted an 
action to require the Commission to take jurisdiction and to grant 
the relief which the steamship company requested.61 The Commis­
sion argued that the court was bound by the Commission's interpre­
tation and that the question of jurisdiction which the Commission 
had decided was as much within the scope of its authority as any 
other question of interpretation.62 
The Commission's argument was based upon statements made 
by the Supreme Court in an earlier case,63 where the Court was re­
ferring to a proceeding before the Commission in which the railroad 
carrier was the owner of extensive coal fields and had sold the coal to 
be delivered for a fixed sum per ton for both the coal and the trans­
portation.64 In that case, New York, New Haven & Hariford Railroad 
Company v. ICC,65 argument was made to the Commission that such 
a fixed sum was insufficient to pay for both the cost of mining the 
coal and the rate of transportation the railroad charged private ship­
pers, and therefore amounted to an "undue or unreasonable prefer­
ence or advantage" contrary to section 3 of the Interstate Commerce 
Act.66 The Commission held otherwise, stating that the vendor-car­
rier had a legal right to charge any loss that may have occurred to its 
account as vendor, rather than to its account as a carrier, and there­
fore the transaction could not be found to be a discrimination be­
tween the freight rate it charged itself and the rate it charged other 
58. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.c. 
§ 10101-11917 (Supp. v 1981». 
59. Id. § 1, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(2) (Supp. v 
1981». 
60. Humbolt S.s., 224 U.S. at 479-80. 
61. Id. at 477-78. 
62. Id. at 476. 
63. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361 (1906). 
64. Id. at 382. 
65. 200 U.S. 361 (1906). 
66. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (current version at 49 U.S.c. 
§ 10741(b)-(d) (Supp. V 1981». 
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shippers.67 The Court stated that such an interpretation given by the 
Commission would be binding on the Court, invoking "the repeated 
declarations of the court that an exertion of power by the Commis­
sion concerning such matters was entitled to great weight and was 
not lightly to be interfered with."68 
In Humbolt Steamship, however, the Court, without so much as 
addressing the question whether any weight should be given the 
Commission's interpretation, stated categorically that Alaska was 
one of the Territories of the United States and ordered the Commis­
sion to take jurisdiction of the cause and proceed to the merits of the 
controversy.69 
Why did the Court act in this independent fashion to apply the 
term "territory" to Alaska? Why was there no discussion of the 
Commission's first-line responsibility for interpreting the statute? If 
we can accurately discern the reason why the Court treated this issue 
in Humbolt Steamship differently from the way it treated the issue in 
New Haven Rai/road,70 we may have the answer to the question as to 
how those cases in which the Court exercised a limited review of an 
agency's interpretation of a statute71 may be distinguished from 
those cases in which it performed an independent evaluation. 72 
The guiding principle seems to be that where a particular inter­
pretation involves an issue as to whether the agency acted within the 
scope of its authority, the Court has ordinarily faced and resolved 
that type of issue in a substantially independent manner.73 When 
the agency's scope of authority has been resolved, interpretations of 
statutory issues within the agency's area of discretion, if reasonable, 
have been favorably decided in the agency's behalf. 
Thus, when the question again arose whether certain practices 
engaged in by a carrier constituted an "undue or unreasonable pref­
erence," the Court reaffirmed the view that the determination of that 
67. Haddock v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co., 3 I.C.c. Rep. 302 
(1890). 
68. 200 U.S. at 402. 
69. 224 U.S. at 481. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
71. See supra note II. 
72. See supra note 12. 
73. See Red Ball Motor Freight v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311 (1964) (whether the ICC 
had jurisdiction over dealers in livestock and commodities who backhauled sugar in their 
trucks under an exception for persons transporting property in furtherance of a primary 
business enterprise (other than transportation) of such persons); Office Employees Int'l 
Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (labor union held to be "employer" of its own 
workers and therefore within the jurisdiction of NLRB). 
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question fell to the agency's administrative discretion. In that case, 
United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company,74 the issue 
was whether the railroad, by granting certain grain reshipping privi­
leges at Nashville while refusing such privileges at Atlanta, had vio­
lated the prohibition against "undue or unreasonable preferences."75 
The lower court thought that since the facts were undisputed, the 
question was one of law which it should decide independently.76 
The Supreme Court reversed, however, saying: 
It is not disputable that from the beginning the very purpose for 
which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a 
body which from its peculiar character would be most fitted to 
primarily decide whether from facts, disputed or undisputed, in a 
given case preference or discrimination existed. . . . Ifthe view of 
the statute upheld below be sustained, the Commission would be­
come but a mere instrument for the purpose of taking testimony to 
be submitted to the courts for their ultimate actionP 
When this analysis is applied to a recent case arising under a 
program for the assistance oflndians,78 the parameters within which 
deference should be accorded an agency is clear. Ramon Ruiz and 
his wife were Papago Indians who left the Papago Reservation in 
Arizona to seek employment fifteen miles away at the Phelps-Dodge 
Copper mines. Although the Ruizes had lived away from the reser­
vation continuously since 1940, they had not been assimilated into 
the dominant culture apart from employment and maintained their 
ties with the reservation. They were denied general assistance bene­
fits by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the ground that eligibility 
was limited to Indians living "on reservations."79 
The Snyder ActSO provided that the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
should expend such moneys as Congress might deem appropriate for 
the assistance of "Indians throughout the United States."81 The an­
nual appropriation Acts authorized assistance to "needy Indians."82 
The formal budget request submitted to Congress, the eligibility re­
quirements in the administrative manual, as well as testimony before 
74. 235 U.S. 314 (1914). 
75. Id. at 318-20. 
76. Id. at 320. 
77. Id. at 320-321 (citation omitted). 
78. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
79. Id. at 204. 
80. 25 U.S.c. § 13 (1976 & Supp. V 1981.) 
81. Id. 
82. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 207 (1974)(citing Department of Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-28, 81 Stat. 59, 60 (1967). 
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successive appropriations subcommittees had all been to the effect 
that assistance of this kind was limited to Indians "on reserva­
tions."83 On the basis of this legislative material, the Secretary of 
Interior took the view that Congress did not intend84 assistance be 
given to Indians in the position of the Ruizes.85 Mr. Justice Black­
mun, writing for a unanimous Court, agreed that there was "some 
force" in the Secretary's argument but said the Court's examination 
of this and other materials "leads us to a conclusion contrary to that 
urged by the Secretary."86 Speaking specifically to the question of 
whether weight should be given to an agency interpretation, Mr. Jus­
tice Blackmun stated that for deference to be granted, it must be 
consistent with the Congressional purpose, and that in this case it 
was "evident" to the Court that Congress did not itself intend to 
limit its authorization to only those Indians directly on, in contrast to 
those "near," the reservation and that therefore the Bureau of Indian 
Affair's interpretation must fail.87 Authority to determine assistance 
eligibility of individual Indians rested with the administrative 
agency. Whether the agency had discretion to exclude Indians not 
on reservations, however, involved a question of the extent of the 
agency's delegated authority and was therefore appropriate for in­
dependent evaluation by the Court. 
No pair of cases illustrates this principle better than two well­
known decisions, often contrasted with each other,88 NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc. 89 and Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB.90In both 
cases, the employers were subject to the National Labor Relations 
Act's requirement that an employer bargain collectively with the 
chosen representatives of his employees.91 The term "employee" 
was not defined by the statute.92 In the Hearst case, the employer 
had refused to bargain collectively with its so-called "newsboys" on 
the ground that they were not employees but independent contrac­
83. Id at 210-12. 
84. Id at 210. 
85. Id at 211. 
86. Id at 212. 
87. Id. 
88. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at § 30.06; L. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 558-61. 
89. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
90. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). 
91. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 158(a)(5) (1976». 
92. Congress provided a more complete definition of "employee" in the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (amending the 
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1976». 
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tors.93 The NLRB, after making the specific findings of fact outlined 
earlier,94 decided that the newsboys were employees and ordered 
Hearst to bargain with them.95 The Supreme Court, reversing the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, upheld the Board's determination, stating: 
Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially 
when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for 
the courts to resolve. . . . But where the question is one of specific 
application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the 
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the 
reviewing court's function is limited.96 
The Board's determination is to be accepted, the court said, if it has 
" 'warrant in the record' " and "a reasonable basis in law."97 
In Packard, the question concerned the right of foremen to bar­
gain collectively98 under the same act.99 The company employed 
about 32,000 rank-and-file workmen and approximately 1,100 "fore­
men."loo As a group, the foremen were stated to be highly paid and, 
unlike the workmen, were paid for justifiable absences and holi­
days.101 The company contended the "foremen" were not "employ­
ees" under the Act and thus the company was under no duty to 
bargain. 102 In 1942, the Board held that foremen were statutory em­
93. 322 U.S. at 113, 119-20. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. 

9S. 322 U.S. at 114. 

96. Id. at 130-31. 
97. Id at 131. The statute was later amended to exclude independent contractors. 
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.c. § IS2(3) (1976». 
The approach in the Hearst case followed in the path of the earlier case of Gray v. 
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), which arose under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, 
SO Stat. 72 (1937). That act authorized the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department 
of Interior to fix minimum prices to be paid for coal but exempted from its provisions 
coal "consumed by the producer." Id. at 83. The Seaboard Airline Railroad entered into 
leases with certain owners and contracted with independent contractors to mine the coal 
with machinery which they leased from the mine owners. The railway filed an applica­
tion for exemption but was turned down by the Commission as not being the "producer" 
of the coal it consumed and therefore not entitled to the exemption. Gray, 314 U.S. at 
403. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission saying: "Such a determination as is 
here involved belongs to the usual administrative routine. . . . Where, as here, a deter­
mination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and 
the administrative conclusion left untouched." Id. at 411-12. 
98. 330 U.S. at 486. 
99. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codi­
fied as amended at 29 U.S.c. § IS8(a)(S) (1976». 
100. 330 U.S. at 487. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 488 
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ployees. 103 One year later, in Maryland Drydock Company,l04 the 
Board reversed its earlier position and held that foremen were not 
statutory employees. 105 Thereafter, in Packard Motor Car Com­
pany,l06 the Board returned to its original position. 107 The Court, in 
a five-to-four decision, affirmed the last determination of the Board, 
but not by the same approach it had used in Hearst .108 Writing for 
the majority, Mr. Justice Jackson stated: "The question presented by 
this case is whether foremen are entitled as a class to the rights of 
self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activi­
ties...."109 The Court held that they were, stating: "[I]t is for Con­
gress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with 
[the statute's] plain terms." 110 
In both Packard and Hearst, the Board construed the same stat­
utory term. In Hearst, where the question was whether newsboys 
were "employees," the Court stated that it must accept the Board's 
determination if it has" 'warrant in the record' " and "a reasonable 
basis in law."lll In Packard, where the issue was whether foremen 
were "employees," the Court, although it affirmed the Board's deci­
sion, did so on the basis of an independent interpretation of the stat­
ute. The four dissenting justices also made a categorical 
determination that foremen were not and could not be "employees" 
under the Act. I 12 Because their unionization may create conflict of 
interest on matters of labor relations, the question of whether super­
visory employees, as a general matter, are protected by the Labor 
Act is a determination necessary to establish an important point of 
reference from which the Board's discretion may be determined. If 
the underlying premise of this discussion is correct, this is the very 
type of issue on which we desire an independent evaluation by the 
Court. When, on the other hand, the same word "employee" is read 
in the context of an issue on the periphery of the area of concern ­
whether it covers specific newsboys- a determination one way or 
the other does not have the same significance in seeing that the 
agency stays within its mandate. 
103. Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961,969 (1942). 
104. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). 
105. Id. at 741-42. 
106. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945). 
107. Id. at 26. 
108. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
109. 330 U.S. at 486. 
110. Id at 490. 
III. 322 U.S at 131. 
112. 330 U.S. at 500 (Douglas, Burton, Frankfurter, J.J., and Vinson, c.J.). 
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The foregoing analysis ofHearst and Packard is reflected in the 
Court's decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company,J13 where the 
question arose whether the company had a duty to bargain with cer­
tain buyers. The Board determined that the buyers were statutory 
"employees" and thus found that the company violated the NLRA 
by refusing to bargain. 1 14 The Court overrode the determination of 
113. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The disparate treatment of the Board's determinations in 
Packard and Hearst closely track an earlier pair of cases under the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In 
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940), the widow of an individ­
ual employee had been awarded compensation for her husband's drowning. Her hus­
band's employer owned a lighter on navigable waters of the United States. The 
decedent's chief task was facilitating the flow of coal from his boat to the vessel being 
fueled - removing obstruction to the flow with a stick. He performed such additional 
tasks as throwing the ship's rope in releasing or making the boat fast. He performed no 
navigation duties but occasionally performed some cleaning duties on the boat. He did 
not work while the boat was en route from the dock to the vessel to be fueled. The 
deputy commissioner, in awarding the compensation to be paid by the employer to the 
widow, held that the decedent was not "a member of a crew." After examining the legis­
lative history of the exception, the Court concluded that the exception was enacted for 
the distinct aim of exempting seamen. Seamen, the Court found, preferred to remain 
outside the coverage of the act, thus retaining the presumed advantages of common law 
remedies. The Court therefore affirmed the determination of the deputy commissioner. 
The question, said the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, was not a question 
of law. "The word 'crew' does not have an absolutely unvarying legal significance." Id. 
at 258. Each case turns on questions of fact, and authority to determine such questions 
has been conferred by Congress to the deputy commissioner. Id. at 257-58. 
But in Norton v. Warner, 321 U.S. 565 (1944), the Court took an altogether different 
approach. Though the statute was the same, the facts were different. This case con­
cerned a worker on a barge which had no mode of power of its own. The worker was a 
seaman. The deputy commissioner determined the barge was not a vessel and the worker 
not a "member of a crew," and therefore held him covered by the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The Court, however, showed no deference toward 
the administrative view in this case, and held that the barge was a vessel and the worker 
"a member of the crew." The Court recalled as it had noted in the South Chicago case 
the reason for the exemption: 
The maritime unions appearing in the present case [as amici curiae) maintain 
that those remedies [at admiralty) are indeed superior to the relief afforded by 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Whether they are more desira­
ble than a system of compensation is not for us to determine. But where Con­
gress has provided that those basic rights shall not be withheld from a class of 
or classes of maritime employees it is our duty on judicial review to respect the 
command and not permit the exemption to be narrowed whether by adminis­
trative construction or otherwise. 
NOr/on, 321 U.S. at 571. 
The statute, the word, and the agency involved were all the same. How then to 
explain the difference except that, read in the context of the latter case, the issue was 
significant in establishing the limits of the exemption? Once the contours of the excep­
tion were established, the agency was free to make a choice as in the coal supply boat 
case. 
114. 416 U.S. at 270-71. 
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the Board, and held that all "managerial employees" were excluded 
from the Act, but then deferred to the Board's decision whether these 
buyers were within the category of managerial employees. I 15 Once 
again, the Court allowed the Board's determination within its discre­
tion to stand, once the reach of its discretion had been determined. 
Another set of cases which may serve to illustrate significantly 
the rationale suggested herein is NLRB v. Highland Park Manufac­
turing Co. 116 and NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling CO."7 The Taft­
Hartley Act" 8 provided that a labor organization could not be certi­
fied by the Board as a collective bargaining agent unless each officer 
of the labor organization and the "officers" of any "national or inter­
national labor organization" of which it was an affiliate or constitu­
ent unit, certified they were not members of the Communist Party. 119 
In Highland Park, the officers of the Textile Workers Union did so 
certify but the officers of the CIa, with which the Textile Union was 
affiliated, did not. The employer refused to bargain with the union. 
The Board held that the CIO was not a "national or international 
labor organization" within the meaning of the statute since it was 
regarded in labor circles as a federation rather than a national or 
international union. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the case, 
maintained that "[t]he best source for us in determining whether a 
term used in the field of industrial relations has a technical connota­
tion is the body to which Congress has committed the administration 
of the statute., Certainly if there is no reasonable ground for re­
jecting the determination of the National Labor Relations Board, its 
view should not be rejected."120 Mr. Justice Douglas cited Hearst in 
his dissent and stated, 
I see no answer to the analysis of Mr. Justice Frankfurter if 
objectivity is our standard and if the expertise of administrative 
agencies is to continue as our guide. In situations no more diffi­
cult than this we have taken the administrative construction of 
statutory words. Until today the test has not been whether the 
construction would be our own if we sat as the Board, but whether 
it has a reasonable basis in custom, practice, or legislative 
liS. Id. at 289-90. 
116. 341 U.S. 322 (1951). 
117. 350 U.S. 264 (1956). 
118. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120,61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
119. Section 101,61 Stat. 146 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, ch. 
372, § 9, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935», relevant language repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 519, 524 (1959). 
120. 341 U.S. at 327 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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history. 121 
But the majority reversed the Board, holding, in an independent ap­
proach, that not to apply the requirement to the very top levels of 
influence and actual power in the labor movement in this country 
would be contrary to the "basic purpose" of the provision which was 
to "wholly eradicate and bar" members of the Communist party 
from leadership in the American labor movement "at each and every 
level."122 Plainly, a majority of the justices believed that the discre­
tion in the Board was not broad enough to determine whether the 
CIO was exempt from the requirement. 
Yet, notwithstanding the purpose to "wholly eradicate and bar" 
members of the Communist party from leadership in the American 
labor movement at each and every level, the Court, in Coca-Cola, 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter this time writing for the majority, let stand 
the Board's determination that the word "officer" in the same provi­
sion included only those persons who occupied a position identified 
as an office in a union's constitution. 123 In the proceeding before the 
Board in that case, the employer offered to prove that the Regional 
Director of the CIO for Kentucky, who admittedly had not filed a 
non-Communist affidavit, was an "officer" within the meaning of the 
statute. The Board rejected this contention on the ground that he 
was not a person occupying a position identified as an office in the 
union's constitution. The Court upheld the Board's determination. 
On one hand, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, if the word is to be 
viewed in its ordinary meaning, "officer" normally means those who 
hold defined offices, and not "the boys in the backroom" whether in 
politics or in the trade-union movement. 124 Citing Hearst, he stated: 
But if the word be deemed to have·a peculiar connotation for 
those intimate with trade union affairs, . . . then of course the 
Board's expertness comes into play. We should affirm its defini­
tion if that definition does not appear too farfetched. 125 
Clearly the Court thought there was a sufficient delegation of au­
thority to enable the Board to make the determination as to which 
officers must take the oath. 
In all of these cases an observable pattern can be identified: the 
agency is permitted to make those statutory interpretations which the 
121. Id at 327-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
122. Id at 325. 
123. Coca-Cola Bot/ling, 350 U.S. at 269. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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Court perceives Congress left to the discretion of the agency, but the 
determination of the extent of the authority given to the agency to 
make the decisions has been determined by the Court.126 
V. POSSIBLE MISCONCEPTIONS 
It may be useful at this stage to anticipate some misconceptions 
that may occur to one or another of the readers of this article. Ad­
ministrative action may take a variety of forms and the distinction 
between these forms may seem to provide a convenient basis for de­
126. Although this principle has prevailed most of the time, it has not been without 
its aberrations. Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45 
(1982), for example, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to restrain "unfair 
methods of competition." In the first case to reach the Supreme Court interpreting "un­
fair method of competition," FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), the Commission had 
ruled that the refusal of a vendor, who held a dominant and controlling position in the 
sale of both cotton ties and jute bagging, to sell ties unless the purchaser would agree to 
buy a proportionate share of cotton bagging was an unfair method of competition.ld at 
424. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission. In its approach, the Court did not 
limit itself to a consideration of whether reasonable grounds existed for the Commis­
sion's decision. Instead, the Court arrived at its conclusion by way of an independent 
judgment of the issue. See id. at 427-29. The conception that the question of what consti­
tuted an "unfair method of competition" was an issue upon which an independent judg­
ment rested with the Court was repeated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in FTC v. 
Motion Pictures Advertising Servo Co., 344 U.S. 392,404 (1953). The determination of 
the scope of that term, he said, "has not been left to the administrative agency as part of 
its fact-finding authority but is a matter of law to be defined by the Courts." In the end, 
however, the Court, recognizing that the agency's very "charter" was to evolve the mean­
ing of "unfair methods of competition," retreated to the line that deference should be 
paid to the administrative judgment on that subject matter. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 
291 U.S. 304 (1934). 
Keppel & Brothers sold penny candies in "break and take" packs, by which children 
were induced to buy lesser amounts of concededly inferior candy in the hope of receiving 
bonus packs containing extra candy and prizes. Id. at 306-07. The FTC issued a cease 
and desist order against the manufacturer on the theory that the marketing scheme con­
travened public policy in tempting children to gamble and compelled those who would 
successfully compete with Keppel to abandon their scruples by similarly tempting chil­
dren.ld. at 307-08. The Court upheld the Commission's determination. While repeating 
that it is for the courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are to be 
deemed unfair, the Court stated that in passing on that question "the determination of 
the Commission is of weight." Id. at 314. The Commission, said Mr. Justice Stone speak­
ing for the Court, was created with the purpose of lodging this function in a body spe­
cially competent to deal with it, " 'by reason of information, experience and careful study 
of the business and economic conditions of the industry affected.''' Mr. Justice Stone 
went on to say that the Commission was "organized in such a manner, with respect to the 
length and expiration of the terms of office of its members as would 'give to them an 
opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with those questions concerning industry 
that comes from experience.''' Id (quoting SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COM­
MERCE, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, II (1914». 
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termining the appropriate scope of judicial review. These distinc­
tions, however, do not provide suitable guidance. 
A. Legislative Rules vs. Interpretive Rules 
It may occur to some, for example, that perhaps the answer may lie 
in whether the agency is explicitly authorized by statute to define the 
statutory term in question. In administrative law, two types of rules 
are issued by agencies: "legislative" and "interpretive."127 Legisla­
tive rules are those issued pursuant to specific statutory authority 
and are said to "have the force and effect of law," whereas interpre­
tive rules are merely statements issued by the agency to advise the 
public of the agency's construction of a statute, which the court is 
free to accept or reject. 128 It might be thought, therefore, that the 
courts have been guided by the principle that deference should be 
accorded to administrative interpretations issued through "legisla­
tive" rules, but not those agency interpretations issued only as so­
called "interpretive" rules. That misconception is dispelled, how­
ever, by comparing Skidmore v. Sw(ft & Company 129 with Addison v. 
Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. 130 
In Skidmore, some employees of a Swift & Company packing 
plant brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act 13 I 
against their employer for overtime. The issue was what constituted 
"working time" under the Act. If the employees were engaged in 
"working time" they were entitled to overtime pay.I32 In addition to 
working a regular day shift, the petitioners agreed to stay in the fire 
hall on the company premises three or four nights a week. For each 
alarm answered, the employees were paid an agreed amount in addi­
tion to their fixed compensation. The company provided sleeping 
quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio. The men used 
their time as they saw fit except that they were required to be ready 
to respond to alarms. 133 The Administrator, given the duty of bring­
ing injunction actions to restrain violations, had set forth his views of 
127. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,301-02 (1979). See the discussion in 2 
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 36-43 (2d ed. 1979) and JAFFE & NATHAN­
SON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 470-82 (3d ed. 1968). The Adminis­
trative Procedure Act itself draws this distinction. See 5 U.S.c. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982). 
128. Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 
(1947). 
129. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
130. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). 
131. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (1976). 
132. See id. § 207; 323 U.S. at 136. 
133. 323 U.S. at 135-36. 
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the proper application of the Act under different circumstances in an 
interpretive bulletin and in informal rulings. 134 The Court held that 
the rulings of the Administrator, while not conclusive or binding on 
the Court, were "entitled to respect." 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of 
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi­
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give 
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 135 
In Ho/Iy Hill, a legislative rule was issued by the same Adminis­
trator under another provision of the same' act, which provided an 
exemption from the Act's overtime requirements for any individual 
employed "within the area of production (as defined by the Admin­
istrator), engaged in. . .canning of agricultural. . .commodities for 
market. ..."136 The Administrator had defined "area of produc­
tion" to include an individual engaged in canning operations if the 
cannery obtained its raw materials exclusively from farms in the 
neighborhood" 'and the number of employees in such establishment 
[did] not exceed seven.' "137 
The Court overrode the Administrator's definition. The textual 
meaning of "area of production," the Court thought, required con­
sideration of varying economic factors. In making his determination, 
"the administrator may properly weigh and synthesize the various 
economic factors. So long as he does that and no more, judgment 
belongs to him and not to the courtS."138 But the Congress did not 
leave the decision to the Administrator whether, within the geo­
graphic bounds defined by him, the Act further permits discrimina­
tion between smaller and bigger establishments. 139 "The 
determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency 
by Congress," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "is not left for the deci­
134, Id, at 138. 
135, Id, at 140. Quoted with approval in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 
141-42 (1976). 
136. 322 U.S. at 608 (quoting Holly Hill Fruit Products v. Addison, 136 F.2d 323, 
324 (5th Cir. 1943)). 
137. Id. at 609 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 536.2(b) (1938)). 
138. Id. at 614. 
139. Id. at 613-16. 
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sion of him in whom authority is vested."140 
So, while in the one case an interpretation contained in a mere 
"interpretive" regulation was held by the Court to be "entitled to 
respect," in the other case an interpretation contained in a "legisla­
tive" regulation, supposedly binding on the Court because issued 
pursuant to apparent delegated authority, was not allowed to rest 
with the Administrator. It is therefore clear that the distinction be­
tween interpretive rules and legislative rules does not determine the 
standard of review accorded agency orders. Rather, as with any 
other administrative order, the standard of review is defined by the 
relationship of the order to the agency's statutory mandate. If within 
the agency's bounds of discretion, the court will defer to the agency's 
reasonable determination. If the bounds of the agency's discretion is 
at issue, however, the court will independently construe the statutory 
term. 
B. Rulemaking vs. Adjudication 
At one point, the existence of the two lines of cases apparently 
in conflict with each other was ascribed to the difference between 
rulemaking and adjudication. 141 Rulemaking, since it is said to have 
the force and effect of law, would be binding on the court, whereas 
adjudications would not. 142 But this does not explain the distinction. 
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,'43 for exam­
ple, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to restrain "unfair 
methods of competition" in interstate commerce. Even where the 
rules for defining unfair methods of competition come from the pro­
cess of adjudication, the determinations of the Commission are to be 
given weight. 144 Similarly, although the NLRB is free to conduct its 
activities either through rulemaking procedures or by adjudication, 
it has elected, with minor exceptions, to proceed by adjudication. '45 
Nevertheless, in Hearst, the court's review of the Board's determina­
tion that newsboys were "employees" was stated by the Court to be a 
limited review. 146 In Holly HI1I, on the other hand, the Court substi­
tuted its judgment for the Administrator's interpretation issued in a 
140. Id at 616. 
141. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 149-52 (1938). 
142. Id at 151-52. 
143. 15 U.S.c. § 45 (1982). 
144. See supra note 126. 
145. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 15-18 (1976). 
146. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131-32. 
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legislative rule making proceeding. 147 Clearly then, the difference in 
treatment cannot be attributed to whether the proceeding is one of 
rulemaking or adjudication. 
C. Adjudication vs. Enforcement 
Judge Learned Hand once intimated that a distinction should 
be drawn between interpretations given in adjudications of contested 
cases and interpretations of officials charged with the duty of enforc­
ing statutes. 148 The position, he reasoned, of a public officer, 
charged with the enforcement of a law, is different from one who 
must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, "his duty is to present 
the case for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the 
court...upon which lies the responsibility of decision." 149 Putting 
aside the fact that this distinction has not been used to determine the 
appropriate scope of review, 150 it seems of questionable validity even 
in theory. The consequences of such a distinction would be to create 
differing standards for application of the same statute depending 
upon the route by which the case reached the court. If by review of 
agency adjudication, then the agency's judgment on the question 
would be accepted if reasonable, even if contrary to the court's in­
terpretation. If, however, the court is reviewing the interpretation of 
an official responsible for enforcement, the interpretation would 
have to give way to the contrary view of the court. The same statu­
tory term might be reviewed under both routes. For example, an 
aggrieved person may petition a court of appeals to review a decision 
of an agency's adjudication in a contested case, while simultane­
ously, the same agency may initiate enforcement action involving the 
same issue. Conceivably, the same circuit court of appeals might be 
called upon to review the two cases at the same time, but would be 
required under Hand's distinction, to employ dissimilar scopes of re­
view. The incongruous results likely under this approach make it 
unsuitable for determining an appropriate standard of review. 
VI. THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS ApPLIED 
What follows is an attempt to apply the analytical framework 
outlined herein to some additional sample cases to ascertain if the 
147. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
148. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789-90 (2d Cir.), 
aJl'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946). 
149. Id at 789. 
150. See, e.g, Coca-Cola Boltling, 350 U.S. at 269. 
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results can be explained, or better explained, in terms of the sug­
gested principle. 
The Court, in an early case,151 was required to determine its role 
in reviewing the Postmaster General's exclusion of certain sheet mu­
sic from second class mail matter as not being a "periodical" under a 
statute that provided for reduced rates for such mail. I52 Said the 
Court: 
[W]e think that, although the question is largely one of law, deter­
mined by a comparison of the exhibit with the statute, there is 
some discretion left in the Postmaster General. ..and that the ex­
ercise of such discretion ought not to be interfered with unless the 
court be clearly of opinion that it was wrong. 153 
A recent tax case l54 provides additional support for the view 
that courts owe deference to agency action taken within the parame­
ters of the agency's delegated authority, regardless of the form of the 
agency's action. The Internal Revenue Code provides an exemption 
from income taxes for "business leagues, chambers of commerce, 
real estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football 
leagues. . .not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ­
ual."155 The National Muffler Dealers Association, organized by 
Midas Muffler franchisees to establish a group to serve as a bargain­
ing agent for its members dealing with Midas, was denied an exemp­
tion as a "business league" by the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service. 156 The Court upheld the Commissioner, saying: 
The statute's term "business league" has no well-defined 
meaning or common usage outside the perimeters of [the Code]. 
It is a term "so general. ..as to render an interpretive regulation 
appropriate.".. .In such a situation, this Court customarily defers 
to the regulation which, "if found to implement the Congressional 
mandate in some reasonable manner, must be upheld." ... 
We do this because "Congress has delegated to the [agency], 
not to the Courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement' of the Internal Revenue 
Code." ... That delegation helps insure that in "this area of lim­
itless factual variations," ... like cases will be treated alike. It 
lSI. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904). 
152. Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 7,20 Stat. 355 (1879). 
153. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 107-08 (1904). 
154. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
ISS. 26 U.S.c. § 50 I (c)(6) (1976). 
156. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 474-75 (1979). 
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also helps guarantee that the rules will be written by "masters of 
the subject" ....157 
It should be noted that a number of cases that are treated by 
some commentators l58 as involving a substitution by the Court of its 
judgment for that of the administrative judgment are actually cases 
in which the Court upheld the interpretation by the agency.159 
Where the Court upholds the agency's interpretation, it is difficult to 
tell how much weight, if any, the Court gave to the administrative 
judgment. Where an agency's interpretation is upheld, only on rare 
occasions will the Court indicate the weight accorded the adminis­
trative decision. 160 In some of the cases the opinions undeniably 
read as expressing an independent view. Nevertheless, since the 
Court did in fact confirm the agency's interpretation, the cases do 
not render less valid the fundamental premise of this article that 
where the boundaries of the agency's discretion have been estab­
lished, its exercise of discretion ought not to be interfered with unless 
the Court is clearly of the opinion that it was wrong. 
It only remains to account for a few cases that, at a hasty glance, 
might seem not to be consistent with the analysis suggested here. 
One of the cases is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 161 
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act 162 and Section 
138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 163 provide that the Sec­
retary of Transportation shall not approve for financing any project 
that requires the use of any public parkland unless there is no "feasi­
ble and prudent" alternative. l64 The Secretary had authorized the 
expenditure of federal funds for the construction of a six-lane inter­
state highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee. The 
157. !d. at 476-77 (citation omitted). 
158. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 30.06 (1976). 
159. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,17-18 (1962); FTC 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 553-54 (1960); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 
U.S. 441, 449 (1947). 
160. For one such occasion, see Justice Rutledge'S concurring opinion, in which 
Justice Frankfurter joined, in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,451 (1947): 
I cannot say that the Board's conclusion. . .is wanting either for warrant in law 
or for reasonable basis in fact. . . . I think it important, not only for this case 
but for like ones which may arise in the future, perhaps as a result of this deci­
sion, to make clear that my concurrence in the Court's disposition of the case is 
based upon the ground I have set forth, and not upon independent judicial 
determination of the question presented on the merits. 
161. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
162. 49 U.S.c. § 1653(1) (1976). 
163. 23 U.S.c. § 138 (1976). 
164. /d.; 49 U.S.c. § 1653(1) (1976). 
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petitioners brought suit to halt construction, contending, among 
other things, that the Secretary had violated the statute. 165 Although 
the Secretary had not issued any regulations defining the term "fea­
sible and prudent" or made any factual findings purporting to show 
why he believed there was no such alternative to use of the parkland, 
the Secretary took the position during the litigation that he had wide 
discretion. 166 It was recognized that the requirement that there be no 
"feasible" alternative granted "little administrative discretion." 
"For this exemption to apply, the Secretary must find that as a mat­
ter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the high­
way along any other route." The Secretary argued, however, that 
the requirement that there be no other "prudent" route required him 
to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests. He 
contended that the Secretary should weigh the detriment resulting 
from the destruction of parkland against the cost of other routes, 
safety considerations, and other factors, and determine on the basis 
of the importance that he attaches to these other factors whether, on 
balance, alternative feasible routes would be "prudent."167 
The Court, however, reached the conclusion that no such wide-
ranging balancing was intended. 
[T]he very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of 
parkland was to be given paramount importance. The few green 
havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless there were 
truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or 
community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached 
extraordinary magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any mean­
ing, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkland un­
less he finds that alternative routes present unique problems. 168 
The Court's independent evaluation of the meaning of the stat­
ute arguably could be accounted for on anyone of several grounds: 
that there had in fact been no prior interpretation of the term by the 
administrator but only argument of counsel after the case was in liti­
gation; the Court's sensitivity to the environmental issue; or even 
perhaps the simple conclusion that the interpretation urged by coun­
sel was an unreasonable one. But the argument can also be made 
that the Court's approach was dictated by the Court's perception that 
this was a significant limitation on the agency's authority. On that 
165. 401 U.S. at 405-09. 
166. Id. at 409. 
167. Id. at 411. 
168. Id at 412-13. 
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view, this is but another illustration of the principle that the determi­
nation of the extent of the authority given to a delegated agency by 
the Congress to make the determination is to be decided indepen­
dently by the Court. Once the Court has outlined the administra­
tor's authority, however, the application of the term within his 
authority is left to the administrator. 
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Company 169 is a case on the other 
side of the line. In 1959, Congress, in order to protect private utili­
ties from further TVA competition, amended the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Act I70 to provide that TVA should make no contracts for 
the sale or delivery of power outside the "area" for which TVA was 
the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957.171 On that date, 
the TVA supplied 62% of the electric power uses in all of Claiborne 
County, Tennessee.172 But in the villages of Tazewell and New 
Tazewell in Claiborne County, the TVA supplied 6% of the power 
and the Kentucky Utilities Company, a private utility company, sup­
plied 94%.173 When TVA made plans to supply electricity to the two 
villages, Kentucky Utilities instituted an action to enjoin the agency 
from supplying power to them, on the ground that the two Tazewells 
were outside the area for which the TVA was the primary source of 
power on July 1, 1957.174 The Court upheld TVA's determination 
that all of Claiborne County was within the area for which TVA was 
the principal source of power, stating: 
Given the innate and inevitable vagueness of the "area" concept 
and the complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this mat­
ter, we think it is more efficient, and thus more in line with the 
overall purposes of the Act, for the courts to take the TVA's "area" 
determinations as their starting points and to set these determina­
tions aside only when they lack reasonable support in relation to 
the statutory purpose of controlling, but not altogether prohibit­
ing, territorial expansion. 175 
Viewed from one standpoint, the issue in this case appears to go 
to the question of the agency's "authority" to expand its operations, 
and under the theory advanced here would seem, therefore, to be 
one for the Court's independent decision. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his 
169. 390 u.s. I (1968). 
170. 16 U.s.c. § 831 (1982). 
171. Id § 83In-4(a). 
172. 390 u.s. at 3. 
173. /d. at 4. 
174. Id. at 5. 
175. Id at 9. 
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dissent, appears to have been thinking along these lines when he ob­
served that "an orderly system of law does not place the enforcement 
of a restraint upon discretion into the unfettered hands of the party 
sought to be restrained ...."176 But the agency's discretion in this 
case included the discretion to determine the "areas" in which it was 
the primary source of power supply.177 The very term "area" is a 
broad term which calls for a determination of the geographic bounds 
of the areas in which TVA was the primary source of power sup­
ply.178 The bounds of these areas could not be defined by Congress 
itself, and the text manifests the undoubted purpose of Congress to 
delegate authority to the TVA to make the determination. 179 It is un­
likely to the point of being inconceivable that Congress intended to 
leave such determination to the vagaries of litigation. As the Court 
held, therefore, the agency's "area" determinations, provided they 
are reasonable, should not be set aside. 180 
Certainly, it is reasonable to say that the cases we have been 
considering have been guided by the principle suggested herein; it is 
hardly possible to say other of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Bar­
low v. Collins l81 than that it is inconsistent with that approach. In 
that case, a statute l82 authorized a program under which payments 
were made to farmers for diverting land from the production of cot­
ton. I83 The authorized participants in the program were permitted 
to assign their payments to secure cash or advances made to finance 
"making a crop."184 The regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture 
defined "making a crop" to include assignments to secure "the pay­
ment of cash rent for land used for planting, cultivation or harvest­
ing." Some of the other advances for which payments might be 
assigned were seed, fertilizer, and equipment, as well as food, cloth­
ing and other necessities for the producer and his dependents. As­
signments could not be made to secure or pay pre-existing debts or 
for the purchase price of a farm.18S Petitioners, cash-rent tenant 
farmers, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the reg­
176. Id. at 14. Justice Harlan thought there should be a more independent scope of 
review. See id. at 13-16. 
177. Seeid. at 12-13. 
178. See id. at 9-10. 
179. See id. at 8-9. 
180. Id. at 9. 
181. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
182. Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321,79 Stat. 1187 (1965). 
183. Id. § 402. 
184. 397 U.S. at 160. 
185. 7 C.F.R. § 709 (1969). 
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ulation permitting them to make assignments to secure the payment 
of cash rent was unauthorized. Their complaint alleged that they 
were injured because the regulation provided their landlord with the 
opportunity to demand that they assign their payments in advance as 
a condition to obtaining a lease to work the land. As a result, the 
complaint stated, the tenants were required to obtain financing of all 
their other farm needs-groceries, clothing, tools and the like-from 
the landlord as well, since prior to harvesting the crop they lacked 
cash and any source of credit other than the landlord. The landlord, 
the complaint alleged, in tum levied such high prices and rates of 
interest on these supplies that the tenants' crop profits were con­
sumed each year in debt payments. 186 
The case was before the Court solely on the issue of whether the 
petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the regulations 
in light of the fact that the regulations did not obligate, but merely 
permitted, tenant farmers to assign the payments. 18? Consequently, 
the Court's decision went only to the standing issue. Nevertheless, in 
the course of arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners had 
standing to challenge the regulations, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking 
for the Court, stated: 
The amended regulation here under challenge was promulgated 
under 16 U.S.c. § 590d(3) which authorizes the Secretary to "pre­
scribe such regulations, as he may deem proper to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter." Plainly this provision does not ex­
pressly preclude judicial review, nor does any other provi­
sion.... Nor does the authority to promulgate such regulations 
"as he may deem proper" in § 590(d)(3) constitute a commitment 
of the task of defining "making a crop" entirely to the discretion­
ary judgment of the Executive Branch without the intervention of 
the courts. On the contrary, since the only or principal dispute 
relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must 
ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the spe­
cial competence of the Secretary, but by judicial application of 
canons of statutory construction. 188 
Although the standing issue alone was decided, it is clear that Mr. 
Justice Douglas conceived the Court's function, if the question of 
interpretation should subsequently be brought to the Court, to em­
brace the right to determine independently the proper interpretation 
186. 397 u.s. at 162-63. 
187. Id. at 160 & n.!. 
188. 397 U.S. at 165-66. 
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of the term "making a crop." 189 This does not appear to be a sound 
view of the appropriate spheres for judicial and administrative inter­
pretation of such a statutory term. 
A decision more congenial to the analysis advocated here arose 
in the administration of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 190 
That statute established a program for controlling air pollution. 191 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to set 
quality standards for the outdoor air used by the general public. 192 
Each state, after promulgation of the standards, was required to sub­
mit an implementing plan that required approval by the EPA if it 
met certain conditions, the main one of which was that the plan pro­
vide for the attainment of the standards "as expeditiously as practi­
cable" but no later than three years from the date of the plan's 
approval. 193 One approach for implementing the standards was that 
adopted by Florida, under which the plan's emission limitations 
would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this ap­
proach, no source was subject to enforcement action during the pre­
attainment period, but all were put on notice of the limitations with 
which they must eventually comply. Georgia, however, elected to 
follow an EPA-endorsed approach under which a State's emission 
limitations would be immediately effective, but the State would have 
the authority to grant variances to particular sources, a factory for 
example, which could not immediately comply with the st~gent 
emission limitations necessary to meet the standards. EPA based its 
power to allow such variance procedures on its interpretation of Sec­
tion 1l0(a)(3) of the Act which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an imple­
mentation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he 
determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has 
been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public 
hearings. 194 
EPA took the position that a proposed variance was a "revi­
sion" and that a state plan may provide for an individual variance so 
long as it does not cause the plan to fail to provide for attainment 
and maintenance of the national standards under paragraph (2). 
189. The suit was later dismissed in the lower court for failure to prosecute. 
190. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) 
(current version at 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
191. 42 U.S.c. § 7410. 
192. /d. § 7408. 
193. Id. § 741O(a)(2)(A). 
194. Id. § 741O(a)(3)(A). 
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The environmental organizations in the suit argued that the revision 
authority of Section 11O(a)(3) was available only for generally appli­
cable changes of a state plan, as distinguished from emission limita­
tions for an individual source. Variances applicable to individual 
sources could be approved, the environmental organizations con­
tended, only if they met the procedural and substantive standards 
set forth in Section 11O(f), under which its postponements may be for 
no more than a year, may be granted only if application was made 
prior to the date of required compliance, and must be supported by 
the agency's determination that the source's continued operation was 
essential to national security or the public health or welfare. 195 
The Supreme Court noted that EPA's construction of the statute 
had been challenged in a number of circuits. 196 The Courts of Ap­
peals for the First, Second and Eighth Circuits rejected the "revi­
sion" authority as a basis for a variance procedure but concluded 
that authority for the exemption prior to the three-year date for 
mandatory attainment of the primary standard nevertheless existed 
as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme. 197 The Ninth Circuit 
concurred in the view that authority for individual variances existed 
as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme but thought that such 
authority existed as well after the attainment date as before. 198 The 
Fifth Circuit, the circuit from which the present case arose,however, 
agreed with the environmental organizations that the "postpone­
ment" provision of Section 11O(t) was the only method by which 
individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission 
standards. 199 
The Supreme Court stated that, 
Without going so far as to hold that the agency's construction of 
the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we 
conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it 
should have been accepted by the reviewing courtS.2oo 
195. 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.c. § 741O(e) (Supp. V 1981». 
196. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 72 (1975). 
197. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875,887 (1st Cir. 1973); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1973). 
198. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 912-13 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
199. Natural Resouces Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 403 (5th Cir. 1974), 
rev'd sub nom., Train v. Natural Resouces Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
200. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 

The suggestion put forward here is that courts will and should 
pay deference to administrative interpretations with respect to issues 
falling within the agency's discretion to establish policy but not to 
determinations of issues necessary to establish the extent of that dis­
cretion.201 The suggested principle may not mark with precision the 
line between those interpretations for which the court will look to the 
agency for guidance and those which the court will determine inde­
pendently of the agency's view, but it does afford some guide for 
judgment. Such a view better explains the decisions and will permit 
the most efficient use of court and agency. 
Although an independent evaluation by the court of any ques­
tion admittedly may give a defeated party additional protection, it is 
not necessary for assuring adequate legal control over the agency. 
Administrative agencies are distinct institutions and are meant to 
have some policy making function. Important as confining agencies 
to their business may be, no less fundamental should be an arrange­
ment that assures the most efficient and effective use of all of our 
institutions. 
201. The conclusion that this distinction accounts for the two apparently conflict­
ing lines of decisions on the scope of review of administrative interpretations of statutes 
is strengthened by the two recent cases of SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), where the 
Court rejected a long-standing interpretation by the SEC of its authority to issue consec­
utive 10 day suspension orders on the basis of evidence revealing a single manipulative 
scheme, 436 U.S. at 122-23, and CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981), in which the 
Court upheld an FCC interpretation of "reasonable access" to broadcasting facilities, 
" 'since Congress has confided the problem to the latter,' " 453 U.S. at 394 (quoting FCC 
v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946». 
